



Image Courtesy: AU-UN IST, Mogadishu, Somalia

Somalia's Security

The Reconstruction of the Somali National Army¹

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Introduction

After over twenty years of civil war, the new Somali government is beginning the process of rebuilding Somali society and in particular the Somali National Army. This paper intends to provide a description / of several of these issues. First, we start with brief summary of the consequences of societal collapse and their deleterious impact on the most basic conditions of civil and military society will be presented. Second, the discussion focuses on the current state of the immediate situation confronting the military sector, particularly the Somali National Army. Third, we briefly focus on the literature concerning peacekeeping. Fourth, the discussion will return to basic practical issues concerning the SNA and suggest the development of a research unit for the SNA to assist in data collection and analysis for study and analysis pertaining to issues impacting leadership development, and capacity building for logistics, recruitment, training, and other tasks of the rebuilding process.

Summary of the Consequences of Societal Collapse

Somalia is coming out of collapse after 25 years of civil war and famine. The last internationally recognized government headed by Mohammed Siad Barre collapsed in 1991. Somalia immediately fractured along regional and clan fault lines. Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid² occupied the capital city of Mogadishu. The northwest region soon declared itself in independent Republic of Somaliland. The United Nations established operations and the U. S. led a unified task force that ended in confrontation commonly referred to as “Blackhawk Down”.³ The situation resulted in the U.S. withdrawing its participation.⁴ The disastrous outcome motivated a change in U.S. policy toward peacekeeping and intervention.⁵ The country continued to devolve into chaos of competing political figures, clan leaders, and warlord factions. Balkanization accelerated with some twenty separate regions claiming independent authority.⁶

The intensity of conflict abated in the later 1990s as individual factions established their domains and a Transitional National Government which was followed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 as a result of an international conference in Kenya led by the Puntland semiautonomous state leader, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.⁷ During this time there were numerous peace negotiation efforts assembled by various political leaders and factions from Somalia, with negotiations held in neighboring states.⁸ Distrust erupted in new clan fighting in Mogadishu the next year; the creation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2005 by a coalition of various civil, clan, and religious leaders. The Islamic Courts Union brought six months of stability to Mogadishu. However, its religious overtones created fear in neighboring regions and in the U.S. as they began to consolidate factious regions. This created international concern that radical interpretation of Islam was coming to power in Somalia.⁹ Whether Ethiopia was influenced by outsiders is uncertain, but they had a reason to worry about their Ogaden region, which is overwhelmingly Somali and envisioned the Islamic Courts, which had established Shari’a law in its zones of control as becoming ever more militant.¹⁰ They entered Somalia ostensibly at the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government and defeated the Courts by December 2006.¹¹

The ICU devolved into a number of factions, the most powerful of which became known as al-Shabaab and reemerged smaller but far more militant in Mogadishu, ... “the exact opposite of what the United States and its allies sought to promote when they supported the

December 2006 Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia.”¹²The United Nations Security Council authorized an African Union peacekeeping mission to support of the TFG in 2007.¹³

In addition, the TFG fearing a security vacuum objected to Ethiopian withdrawal which did not occur until 2009. A coalition was formed at a meeting in Djibouti between former ICU leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and TFG now led by Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein. The militant wing of the former ICU consolidated under al-Shabaab rejected these prospective peace arrangements despite the fact that Sharif Sheikh Ahmed became president of Somalia in 2009 (serving to 2012).¹⁴

Mogadishu exploded in conflict in 2010 after al-Shabaab attacked the AMISOM mission there. In February - March of 2011 and later in May, the AU began to gradually take more ground in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu August 2011.¹⁵ During 2012 the TFG and AMISOM consolidated gains and pushed further into al-Shabaab areas. The TFG was dissolved in August 2012; the Federal Republic of Somalia was established with the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president.¹⁶ During the last three years there have been considerable gains in securing territory.¹⁷ However, as control has been expanded, insurgency has taken asymmetric options in targeted killings and occasional random terror over the last three years - specifically targeting political officials, various hotels housing officials and foreigners and even attacking Turkish workers. During this time, Somalia has been trying to rebuild literally every government institution. They face a daunting task given that there is no institutional infrastructure, data history since the collapse - none.¹⁸

Security Examples of Challenges across Somalia and in Mogadishu

Mogadishu has been the ‘Stalingrad’ of East Africa until only recently. The Turkish government and Turkish private sector is rebuilding infrastructure.

There is little / no means to link the ordinary citizen identification to an actual physical address and

The unregulated availability of the mobile phone SIM card allows opportunities for terror

Need for the most basic data table information for identification of individuals in the organized crime and al-Shabaab networks.

Al-Shabaab is adapting and morphing organizationally. Officials presented a 3 tier faction:

- Foreign led - leaders have experienced life outside Somalia
- Somali led - but also traveled and globally aware
- Somali led with no experience outside Somalia / Horn region - considered by many as the most hardline faction

Source: National Conference on Internal Security, April 20 -23, 2014, Jazeera Hotel, Mogadishu

Fundamental National Challenges

The following encapsulates a few of the many general challenges for the present government.¹⁹

- The Somali government must expand its “decision space” for virtually all institutions – particularly the security sector - a period of perhaps 2 – 6 years by way of small determined steps
- The Federalist arrangement and its consequences / significance for the central government
- The danger of Balkanization, which would threaten Somali society in terms of controlling / channeling international macro pressures

- The creation of a fair and equitable tax and revenue stream to support the government and the social reconciliation and development projects and be far less dependent on international donors – external funds often come with provisos
- Various ministries possess little “institutional memory”; previous governments either did not well document efforts or did not ensure that their work was left available for the successor government(s). There is literally no organized information about resources, physical capital, etc. from the TFG or earlier - any findings are serendipitous
- The restructuring of military and police security apparatus must garner the legitimacy from the Somali society. The FGS should be far more cognizant of the distinction of security model types (State oriented model and Citizenship oriented model) – both are required in a mix appropriate for addressing crisis and building and maintaining legitimacy over the next two decades
- The growth in design and implantation of programs to fulfill the overarching strategy of the six pillar policy
- The development of public space and the elimination of drivers of conflict

Current State of the SNA

The biggest issues confronting the Somali National Army (SNA) are the achievement of successful integration, sustenance, training and equipment. Subsequent to the collapse of the government and army in 1991 military forces were clan / warlord conglomerations. The transitional governments of the last decade up to the current government basically formed their fighting forces with a variety of elements including men from the old Barre military, Puntland and Jowhar clan militias. After Ethiopia occupied Mogadishu, members from various warlord militias and clans in and around Mogadishu joined. In 2009, clan based militias from central Somalia joined the TFG, including former fighters earlier associated with the Islamic Courts, e.g. the Juba Valley Alliance. Conditions were so poor, that troops were required to have their own weapons. Further, clan militias and other groups that were not well armed and/ or ignored by the TFG were recruited by al-Shabaab. Thus, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) inherited an army of clan devised, led and loyal militia shaped force.²⁰

Integration

In April 2014 President Mohamud opened the National Conference on Internal Security held in Mogadishu. His remarks included a statement that the clan structure was beginning to give way and that soldiers were beginning to adopt a national identity.²¹ This need for integration of the SNA is perhaps the most fundamental of thorny political difficulties. To further this, a National Commission for the Somali National Army Integration was formed in May 2015, which will be chaired by Minister for Defence, Mohamed Ali Haggaa.²² Whatever the final formula devised for the composition of the SNA, the most important parameter is the requirement of integration; if the vast majority of soldiers do not develop a national identity and national allegiance above that of clan, region, and warlord - then it is a failed effort and prospects for a unified Somalia are endangered. The process will take a number of years and has significant hurdles to surmount. Much of the present (and aging) senior leadership’ status and influence is built around the old structures; those with stakes in the present arrangements have to be willing to take the risk of sacrificing their influence for the unification; they may require incentives.

Further, tied their complex political work ahead is the decision of how broadly the Commission will extend its outreach for input. This in turn is connected to what they already envision concerning what kind of Army is being designed. The conjecture is that without the most inclusive considerations for input, the decision process will be focused on traditional concepts of military construction and forego a unique opportunity to advance a peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, peace-development capacity.²³ In an earlier effort one of the authors and a Somali colleague conducted a Somali community focus group in Toronto in June of 2013. One of the questions asked concerned what kind of a military they wanted for Somalia.²⁴

What Kind of Army


The question of inclusiveness for input is perhaps critical; without it seems assured that the political and military discussion will exclusively focus on integration in terms of traditional conceptions of military construction for war-fighting capacity. This traditional view is reflected in one of the principal internal discussion documents concerning priorities for training the SNA²⁵. As might be expected, the document has no coverage for peacekeeping duties, it is basically very conventional in terms of seeking preparedness for a war-fighting army; and while this is of course necessary it foregoes the opportunity for a much broader and arguably more efficacious peacekeeping Army. Educational levels are a problem. The exact percentages are unknown, but it is recognized that some military specialty categories will be far harder to populate because some soldiers simply do not have the acquired educational capacity. This factor is probably of greater weight in terms of creating a peacekeeping capacity, which requires strong social skills and intuition far more than any of the traditional functions and roles. It may not be a question of one or the other but rather a matter of balance and political -military needs of the immediate crisis. The danger is that planning could succumb by orientation to the crisis of the immediate, confusing the temporal and the symbolic.²⁶ Again, the training document focuses on long term in the capacity building for a constructing war-fighting military.

The National Commission for the Somali National Army Integration could represent a crucial component on whether peacekeeping focus will be included in the organizational design depending on how inclusive its focus becomes. For example, should the Commission hold ‘field hearings’ around the regions open to all community sectors?²⁷ If it did so, it would help develop ‘ownership’ among citizens, whom must view the SNA as legitimate, representing all Somalis. Without a perception of legitimacy among the citizens the government can obtain only marginal success. This is a constant process, not an event outcome. Further, such ‘hearings’ might document a considerable reserve of pent-up demand for the forms of military action discussed across the range of peacekeeping literature. Perhaps two forms of military capacity are required for the long-term parameters associated with reconciliation, peace, and development - for war fighting and one for peacekeeping and peace development. Peacekeeping and war-making require very different skill sets underpinned by very different mind sets.²⁸ It can be argued that it is a task enough to develop one model; the rebuttal here is that is not much more to add a peacekeeping a future capacity and the required training into the organizational model being developed. Once in the organizational table, it should not be an orphaned child. Certainly the focus, attitude, and training needs are significantly different and reflected in the literature; these are solid skills which will be found valuable over the coming decades of rebuilding the society. Of particular relevance is the traditional military tendency to isolate out, exclude others. This was particularly the case in Somalia among the U.S. as an interventionist force, where the political dimensions of the situation were simply not acknowledged.²⁹

On one hand, there are the more traditional military versions of peacekeeping and working with the population such as reflected in US Army War College and on the other studies and briefs where many of the issues of linkage, need for coordination and cooperation with other actors are acknowledged³⁰ with phrases such as ... “we cannot kill or capture our way to victory” ... but rarely aggressively implemented because military tradition argues against it. The focus remains on closely holding command and control. Inevitably, despite all the planning, the familiar and the traditional overwhelmingly govern the domain; tradition is transformed into a culture and /or an ideology; there is never a ‘hand off’.³¹

The National Commission for the Somali National Army Integration may alter this tendency of the future by taking the path toward inclusiveness, thereby impacting ownership of the SNA and strengthening citizenship by increasing the size of the public space visa vie building a

comprehensive national discussion to the notion of integration around the critical questions what kind of army does Somalia need and want. Even if the Commission and the Ministry of Defense opt for only the traditional model, they should make structural / organizational allowances for cooperation and integrative strategies /tactics with the national police - a case of strategic



peacekeeping meeting strategic policing, particularly around issues pertaining to working with the local community, genuinely seeking their input and advice concerning the improvement of civil- military and community - police relations, all of which has to positively impact intelligence gathering.³²

The idea is that the self-perception of peacekeeper is / should be as a facilitator or a ‘stage manager’ whose presence provides opportunity for civilians to succeed as individuals, as a community, and as a nation. Peacekeeping and peace -development training would significantly contribute to the growth and development of the SNA for the long term - and since it is overwhelmingly involves far more human relations skills than physical capital is both affordable and sustainable.³³ In addition, it is the obvious understanding that such ongoing civil - military relations programs will be necessary for a number of years.

State of Current Physical and Human Capital

On the physical capital, it must be noted at the outset that a significant issue of resources for the SNA is extremely problematic. During the 1990s virtually all government institutions were decimated, their documents of institutional history destroyed.³⁴ Consequently, specific numbers such as provided by one source indicating troop numbers and particularly the status of equipment are suspect.³⁵ In fact, the physical capital is extremely limited because of the embargo, the limitations of trained officers and men to manage such equipment. The U. S. has provided material³⁶ after the partial lifting of the arms embargo has enabled the government to purchase small arms; 'armored vehicles' are mostly Land-cruiser pickups mounted with a 12.5 mm heavy machine gun; the SNA has 4x4 tactical transport trucks, water and fuel tankers, ambulances and recovery vehicles.³⁷

One can assume that any new significant equipment would have to have been approved by the UN and that the Somali government succeeded in acquiring with advanced approval under the conditions of the various UN Security Council Resolutions and amendments over the decades.³⁸ With this development the SNA created the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group (WAMTWG) to conduct storage requirement studies.³⁹ A second issue has been training facilities, which until recently required soldiers to be trained elsewhere, e.g. Uganda (European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia)⁴⁰, Italy⁴¹, and others. Turkey has been providing tremendous infrastructure assistance to Somalia over the last few years and recently came to an agreement with the Somali government to train some of its military personnel.⁴² Finally, there have been some indications that the U.S. has an unobtrusive presence in Somalia.⁴³ Recently, the United Arab Emirates partnered with Somalia to launch a new training facility at Camp Jazeera. This endeavor will revitalize the facility, which was suffering from resource management and control issues, has lacked training aids and been seriously in need of resources.⁴⁴ Most recently Somaliland platoon commanders and military police graduated from a European Union Training Mission conducted there.⁴⁵

On the human capital, the Somali Ministry of Defense has established a Defense Working Group (DWG) and a Training Steering Group (TSG) to assist in the development and implementation of a training regime.⁴⁶ The organizational development needs can be broken down in traditional tiers of officer manpower and training requirements. For example, to utilize the US nomenclature, the senior leadership consists of the SNA is in serious need of identifying, recruiting, and training, line and field lower level grade officers. An entire recruiting system has to be established. In an iterative loop, this immediately returns to the resource issue of pay and sustenance for soldiers. It is unclear if this is impacted by regional or rank factors or both as well as other parameters. In response to the myriad of difficulties, the European Union Council will be relying on General Massimo Mingiardi to help with the training and development of the SNA.

Moreover, both AMISOM and UNSOM Human Rights are providing services; the former performing refresher training and the latter human relations training. Yet, the pay and sustenance issue are as yet murky and perhaps not uniform or systematic and is reflected in what would be in the US military unauthorized absence. Troops are reluctant to leave their units and undergo training for fear of missing pay. Also soldiers have left Camp Jazeera or not shown up because they have not been fed properly; other factors include discipline and particularly literacy issues.

Besides the officer identification, recruitment and training issue the SNA needs to address basic NCO leadership development programs, basic recruit training programs and the gamut of specialist training, radio operators, medics, logistics personnel, military police, equipment technicians, etc. The list of needs is so fundamental that it is no exaggeration to suggest that Somalia is building its army from the very foundation. The Training Steering Group is in the midst of developing a plan to provide advice to most senior levels.

Focus of the Literature

For the sake of discussion we have categorized two types of military organization, each with a distinct orientation: traditional war fighting and peace enforcement, and peacekeeping and peace development. A brief literature review concerning these two orientations provides evidence that they are distinct types, though they can overlap. This most frequently takes place under conditions other than war.

Certainly in the West, one principal theme in military sociology concerns the state of civil-military relations and the military profession. Usually two tracks are noted, Huntington's state centric orientation with its suggestion that security priorities may overtake those of liberty and Janowitz' citizenship and public service orientation. The work of these two pioneers was seminal in developing the field of military sociology. During the 1980s, both of these perspectives were showing their age; since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of new perspectives and/or vectors of development. The 'senior' leadership in these new areas includes figures such as Peter D. Feaver, who introduced the principal - agent theme from economics into analysis of civil military relations. Are the agents fulfilling their obligations to the principals (the President, the Congress, the nation) or are they pursuing their own goals. This was followed up with the discussion concerning the divide between the military and civilian leadership concerning the use of force, particularly as the U.S. political leadership moved to accelerate its push for war in Iraq.⁴⁷

Ubiquitous Change of Conditions

The theme of change has been extremely central to discussions about the nature of war and society and questions the adaptability of the U.S. military and militaries in general to develop new capabilities to meet a new threat environment and diverse security functions and roles in a global age.⁴⁸ This new environment has many features not present before the explosion of the information age and the first gulf war in the early 1990s, but increasingly identified by a variety of researchers and political writers after the conditions were branded as part of a meta centric new world order by President George H. W. Bush.⁴⁹

The trends and changes that have generated so much concern, controversy, and debate are significant. First and foremost, there are the overwhelming twin mega variables of technology and the rise of the global economy. There have been other 'ages' of globalization and constant incremental change in an analog world where many of the seeds of the present / future developed their roots. However, the digital age which began with many features of basic science in the 1950s, and efficaciously came of age in the early 1980s and 1990s spawned unparalleled micro to macro transformations in the financial and corporate world that were not possible or thought of earlier. These can be quickly encapsulated with reference to the birth of the microcomputer and the word processor and spreadsheet applications for a

micro example; macro examples would include the design and implementation of distributed global manufacturing and the rise in prominence of world markets and the trans-national corporations as powerful actors in the global political economy, indeed impacting even the mainstream conceptualizations of foreign relations theory.⁵⁰

Discussion pertaining to how these changes confronted military institutions, particularly in the West, came to revolve around several themes. The most open-ended prospect focused on technology and the rise of the digital battlefield. The almost science discussion has approached almost science fiction in terms of weapons imagined and proposed for development. One sector of this has concerned advanced communication and weapons systems, which arrived with significant organizational baggage during the first Gulf War as noted Mandeles' excellent discussion.⁵¹ One subsector focus of the technological explosion is on 'non-lethal' weapons development; here the 'list' of imaginative to real weapons has included bio-control of narcotics, UVE-LIDAR (low grade laser environment detection and tracking system), computer viruses, super polymers, micro-biotic technology, caltative agents, and more.⁵² Another sector is particularly focused on cyber war, robotics of drones and other information gathering / 'automated' battlefield technologies impacting the techniques of even the basic infantry soldiers.⁵³

Another sector of the traditional war-fighting literature focuses on the impact of technological and global change on military leadership and performance at various levels throughout the entire system including the difficulties presented by a stateless enemy.⁵⁴ Attention at the highest military / civilian levels focuses on the relationship between leadership quality and satisfaction, and variables such graduate education levels and private sector management experience.⁵⁵ Examination of cadet and young officers has focused on conceptions and descriptions of leadership in their research as have studies of military women.⁵⁶ Two solid efforts examined performance and experiences of line grade officers in coalition forces and the enlisted American soldier in Iraq.⁵⁷

One of the fundamental issues of economic and technological change impacting the U.S. military has been the phenomenon of privatization. This has been on-going since the end of the draft and the initialization of the volunteer force. However, outsourcing and privatization has steadily encroached upon ever-more military functions. Essentially virtually all of combat service support functions and the more closely associated combat support functions have been outsourced or privatized, the difference being the latter involves the actual loss of capacity. This trend has developed with its own crisis of command and control visa vie responsibility and accountability as well as performance and is now penetrating into core functions threatening control of the profession.⁵⁸

Another similar vector concerns jurisdictional issues concerning the revolution in military affairs enhancing issues such as preemptive warfare with powerful command and control systems that others argue obviates war of attrition in favor of war of maneuverability with its great possibilities albeit accompanied by a number of implications and difficulties for traditional war-fighting.⁵⁹ Somewhere along the political path, this enamor with technology became fused with the notion of 'full spectrum dominance' a fusion of economic, military, and cultural superiority that emboldened the G. W. Bush administration to engage in preemptive war in Iraq and enmeshed journalists in the political conflict.⁶⁰ Finally, it has been

argued that all of this political economic and ideological change has entered into the culture of the military in tandem with the gradual ‘Republicanization’ of the officer corps of the G.W. Bush

Administration.⁶¹ Since that time, a new trend developing seems to be toward highly coordinated specialized - distinctive tactical capabilities for specific missions - with substantial technological support packages. The

Past	Present - Future		Future
War of attrition - analog war	Digital war of maneuverability - enabled by technological revolution in military affairs	Conflict of specific special teams and technological packages	Peace enforcement/ peacekeeping / peace development platforms

Source: Paul Camacho and Ibrahim Mohamed, 2016

argument here is that the future will require the inclusion and coordination of a peace enforcement / peacekeeping / peace development platform. Battle success is necessary but no longer sufficient; genuine victory is in peace, stability, and development that is so inclusive that the majority of preconditions for conflict can be surmounted, addressed, or solved in the political socio-economic sphere.⁶²

A Segue to the Peacekeeping Literature

One theme touched on above has concerned the change face of conflict, particularly in Africa and was known as the “arc of instability” or “non-integrating gap”, where internal or intra-state conflict was now becoming the primary type of conflict.⁶³ States were collapsing and failing and response was to usher in peacekeeping studies. One author considered it a consequence of the ‘new world order’ and viewed these transitions as a paradigm crisis in international doctrine.⁶⁴ This collapse and state failure was pushed to the forefront of studies after the Cold War with the devolution of the Yugoslavian state, the birth of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia. The violence of the conflict in the Balkans of Europe initiated an accelerated interest in peacekeeping studies.

In his introduction to a special issue on Peacekeeping for *Armed Forces & Society*, James Burk noted several points / conditions: the increase in missions, a new matrix of complex tasks not immediate associated with war-fighting, a lack of understanding of ‘best practices’ and an relative absence of doctrine despite a quite expansive discussion in the military literature⁶⁵, as well as other factors e.g. attitude and performance of military personnel from commanders to ordinary soldiers.⁶⁶ A bit under twenty years has passed since that issue; given the outcomes of two wars and numerous interventions by US, coalition, and / or UN forces the basic reality not yet acknowledge by all, is that there are (at least for the foreseeable future) no victories obtained by military war-fighting alone. We have witnessed the obvious - that the winning battles, however essential, is not sufficient. The complexity of the globalized world has led to a discussion of the changing roles and functions of military deployments along macro, mid-level, and micro parameters in an accelerating fractured world. Stabilization then, is a “growth industry” requires numerous player types and significant resources.⁶⁷

The best of the big picture rests on studies from the perspective of researchers on peacekeeping other than a focus on military command and control / roles and functions. That is, the ‘standard’ military peacekeeping literature focus on intervention at the theoretical

level of macro political decision making⁶⁸, and at the operations levels of command and control in the milieu of multiple organizational and coordination factors influencing success and failure as mentioned above, here, and below.⁶⁹ Other ‘big picture’ is that research takes a position different from the conflict resolution literature on issue negotiation resulting from analysis of tabular issue distinctions - rather insisting the focus must be on the rebuilding of relationships among not simply the leadership who are often immune to consequences of their own decisions, but rather among the local citizenry that are surrounded by the tension in their very districts and neighborhoods.⁷⁰ The focus below is on the military peacekeeping issues of attitudes, performance, organization and doctrine.

Attitudes

Avant and Lebovic found no strong opposition to the ‘new’ intervention situations by service or by perception of threats. Officers took their cues according to the extent of Presidential, congressional, and the U.S. public support. Others found a mild to strong distinction between the attitudes of soldiers in the combat units and those of support units.⁷¹ Combat units wanted the clarity, were anxious to prove their ‘warrior’ skills. In Somalia, Moskos and Miller found both support among minorities, women, and non-combat units and resistance predominantly among those in combat units of US Army personnel; initial altruistic enthusiasm emaciated as hostilities accelerated. Two years later, the same issue of attitude toward the peacekeeping intervention was examined by Miller again. It seems that a strong sense of understanding of the mission and its difficulties has to be a carefully constructed narrative. Further, it may be that soldiers realize that they possess incompatible skill sets for the limited rules of engagement and their role in peacekeeping, while support soldiers experience less of a role strain.⁷²

Performance

Performance has been examined in a number of peacekeeping environments. Again, it appears that superior performance is tied to a solid understanding of the mission and the soldiers’ perception of their role in the mission and is cognizant of the potential pitfalls (ability to deploy rapidly, an understanding of the need for restraint, and its relationship to legitimacy from the population). Role clarity was also important in reducing various types of stress, thereby contributing to better performance.⁷³ Also other important area is that peacekeeping is more apt to be successful before or after, but not during the failed state catastrophe.⁷⁴ The disputants generally need incentives, options, or assessments of costs and benefits that persuade them toward the cessation of conflict.

Operations and Doctrine

Discussion of the histories of various operations is one of the primary sources for discussion of avenues by which to improve military operations (lessons learned) and hopefully leads to the development of doctrine. This has been done to varying degrees for interventions in Africa with discussion about types of peacekeeping forces and the problems of coordination as well as discussion concerning the relationships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).⁷⁵ Discussions about the limits of intervention, conflict resolution, institutional and other arrangements are also a focus in this sector of peacekeeping. Also,

many of the issues of command and control, new weapons technology, 'nation building, and the factor of public opinion were part and parcel of earlier intervention studies.⁷⁶ Others focus on understanding and working with the civilian side in developing a broader framework that actively incorporates the local population building on cultural resources and those local citizen activists who are seeking peace.⁷⁷

Other Considerations

One of the ideas put forward has been the concept of a national institution capacity development program which will endeavor to develop a strategy for improving the technical and human resource capabilities and develops a directorate to provide administrative support for a variety of projects.⁷⁸ For example, one project would construct an organizational chart of the government ministries and their foreign partners and their projects to assist in coordination and manage any duplication of efforts. In essence this is a meta data project that will involve discussions with various staff personnel from selected institutions concerning clarity of mission, expected output, etc. The institution will essentially be rated to its organizational structures and processes, as well as to assess its strategies and ability to achieve its goals. The goal of the development program is to help develop, coordinate, and implement development plans for the institution in question.

From this broad and more basic framework, the concept of developing a capacity building unit for the SNA and perhaps the MOD is being considered. It would ... "gather and analyze the information pertaining to our current institutional capacity, harmonize capacity building programs to avoid overlapping, identify areas of priority, anticipate changes and implement new development strategies tailored to our specific needs and requirements." Essentially, this would be or would have in it organizational table a social science research unit or center to carry out research projects as the SNA sees fit. Currently the most basic themes are being explored. However, in theory it portends to be a sizable operation providing data and decision support management systems for the SNA leadership.

Initial Research Goal

At present the effort is to design an initial organizational unit consisting of a unit manager, a social science design / developer, a data management developer, along with interview and data entry personnel. Recently a new Chief of Somalia Armed Forces, General Mohamed Aden Ahmed has now succeeded Major General Dahir Aden Elmi.⁷⁹ It will take some efforts to see this initial project remains of the list of 'possible projects agenda'. Whatever the fate of this avenue, the task remains to flesh out a plausible research unit development project and engage the several government officials from various ministries and commissions who have expressed some interest in the idea. The authors were hoping to conduct a skeleton project at Camp Jazeera consisting of three focus groups and interviews with a small number of trainees. Obviously, sponsors must be found. It is perhaps best simply to 'bullet' the ideas with some overlaps being considered.

- A Personnel Information Verification Form (PIVF) / photograph / fingerprints for identification; ancillary material would include various performance measures for the soldier, enabling the SNA to grasp the current state of its human capital and inform them about training needs for any specific soldier, or unit.

- Personnel Evaluation System that will set a value/designation based on indicators that are required for personnel to attain in order to meet expectations according to the desired competencies, skills, and level of training necessary, etc.
- Personnel Selection System that will identify proper candidates most likely to succeed for specific military occupations.
- Assemble physical capital database (gap analysis) comparing current and desired capability to improve the overall capacity of the SNA
- Develop sets of questions that assess soldiers' vision and conception of their personal future and hopes, etc.⁸⁰

Summary and Policy Frameworks to Consider

The sketch below is fairly confined to issues immediate to the function and roles of the SNA. However, neither they nor any other institution, have the status of independent variable in the context of either the global economy or the recovery of their fragile state. Other parameters and factors which they have little or no influence over have considerable consequence for them. We can only mention them some of them here. The financial health of the global economy, the sincerity and commitment of the donor community to honor pledges are two exogenous variables. Endogenous to Somalia, yet basically outside SNA influence include the progress towards the development of the permanent constitution, the ability of the government to secure sustainable tax revenue.

Devising an economic policy mindful of the necessity of providing opportunities for the base, working, and middle sectors of society and coming to an agreement on the reintegration of the internally displaced would ameliorate two preconditions / potential drivers of conflict. Other factors involve the progress of recovery in other institutional sectors or subsectors, e.g. the formation of a viable central bank and reforms of the financial system. Still another difficulty is the political relationship with the Ethiopia and Kenya, abutting nations with which there are territorial issues / disputes; and many more.

Micro Level

There are also 'hybrid' situations that impact security while not directly within the SNA's purview. The lack of retrievable knowledge of persons and physical addresses in Mogadishu represents a serious security issue; the administration in Mogadishu does not know the identity of its residents. The SIM card phenomenon represents another puzzle removed from SNA functions / responsibilities; without a solution, security forces cannot correlate a cell phone to an individual, or an address. Somalia is in the process of literally re-building every government and civic institution from the ground up. There is a need for a tremendous training for the security and intelligence forces across all security sectors. Camp Jazeera should be developed as rapidly as possible with the appropriate physical capital installed and the most basic training essentials initialized. An educational solution is required so as to overcome the difficulty of filling some of the traditional military specialties; perhaps general education classes could also be conducted at Camp Jazeera base.

The payment and sustenance issues emaciating soldier's moral remain to be addressed in a uniform manner. Finally, a number of assessments of value to the SNA can be made with

very low cost social science initiatives as developed by initializing a research unit for the SNA.

Mid-Level

A few of the ideas / projects conceptualized include but are not limited to the implementation of structural and programmatic reforms that encourage / incentivize national identification over regional and traditional identifications. The line and field grade officer recruitment and development issue requires attention and solutions. Perhaps the government can develop programs that can successfully call on young men of Diaspora to serve and the government should not leave this resourceful population to al-Shabaab to recruit.

The integration program is a critical effort in this endeavor for SNA. To garner public legitimacy, the process needs to be inclusive, and discussions should not be limited to the leadership of the security sector. A significant harvest of legitimacy could be accrued if National Commission for the Somali National Army Integration held a series of “field hearings” around the nation inclusive of all identifiable Somali communities to exercise a productive citizenship.⁸¹ Moreover, another concept the Somali government might deliberate is the Janowitz / Moskos conceptions of military service / public service. A robust national civic service program with functions and roles for all identification groups in Somali society comes to mind.⁸² Young professional Somali - Americans, Canadians, and others from the Diaspora are eager to find a path to contribute to the nationalization efforts despite there are lack of resources to exploit them. However, the consequences of disenchantment of this human capital should be a major concern for everyone.

While al-Shabaab’s control has been exorcised from Mogadishu (a city of two million), they still are quite capable of and do attack targets there, e.g. political members of parliament and hotels which house government officials and / foreign visitors. These activities generate frustration, distrust, and bitterness. Yet, former President Sh. Mohamud has made a number of offers of amnesty and negotiations with various elements of the opponents of the federal government and should consider engaging in negotiations / dialogue with some of al-Shabaab elements in an effort to obtain reconciliation.⁸³

Macro Level

Somalia must conceptualize a long term vision of reconciliation, peace, unity, and development or risk perpetually trying to get there, but never arriving. It would become a victim to the “tyranny of emergency”⁸⁴ robbing it of decision space, consequently distorting both organizational purpose and strategies - negatively impacting outcomes. A united and prosperous Somalia will ensure a prosperous and cooperative IGAD coalition. A stable and democracy that is in line with the Somali tradition is achievable, but it needs relatively little support and careful understanding that the democratization process that Somalia is going through is not interchangeable with the ideological mindset of the US, Commonwealth of Nations, or the European Union. Civil-military relations theorists and practitioners, as well as those in related social science fields, should accept this reality as a factor of tangible and volitional world conditions.

It will take a minimum of two decades to rebuild Somalia and produce democratic conditions on the ground. There is no “democracy in a box” as there is no magical development solution from the post- Washington consensus prescriptions. If the present Somali government is successful in its rebuilding efforts and stabilizing society, it will have performed a vital contribution to global stability. Events should not be left to chance and Somalia’s effort toward rebuilding its government institutions should not be neglected as a result of any crisis consciousness.

Global Level

At the global level, there has been no innovation to combat the recruitment of global youth by the al-Shabaab’s and ISIL’s of the world. Alienated youth have been a subject of study in the West and US for decades. One of the most interesting theories has been the learning theory / social bond sector of social control theory, which focuses on four types of social processes: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief as anchors grounding youth to society.⁸⁵ Alienated youth need structure, but the only group offering opportunity to belong is the terror groups. The UN needs to develop and advertise a program of global civic service to the young people around the globe that offers opportunity for a sense of belonging and ‘adventure’ that is linked to positive, peace development opportunities of construction. Whatever networks of programs are in existences, they are not competitive enough with those of the apocalyptic terror groups - this is a serious failure of official neglect.⁸⁶

Global consequences of conflict in Iraq and Syria, the refugee crisis inundating the European Union is of great importance, but should not crowd out focus on security in other regions. While acknowledging the need for the continuation of some level of military action, perhaps it is time to address our addiction to crisis management and seriously consider and develop a broad new geo-political plan to address realities and in the long run, conserve resources for use toward projects that offer plausible success. Of particular focus should be the response of the West toward the refugee crisis. There has been no coordination by the EU and, with some exceptions, little in the way of leadership, and the current refugee flows into the EU are the result of basic conflicts within and among nations. It may be that globalization in all its consequences that can be noted thus far, are in fact accelerating. Thus, a coordination of enormous capacity building is required to address the refugee flows of today and the immediate and mid-term future is required. It should be seen as a peace-development opportunity. By whatever name and under whatever rubric - nation-building is upon the West; failure will dramatically fuel accelerating conflict. Thus, the need to respond must be viewed as an opportunity for peace development; there is no other choice.

The present situation/ condition of Somalia provides the world its best opportunity in the last twenty-five years to stabilize a critical geopolitically located nation. The outcome in Somalia should not be left to chance resulting from the preoccupation with the Iraq-Syria crisis which cannot be addressed with traditional security responses that Braybrooke and Lindblom described as strategies of disjointed incrementalism over four decades ago.⁸⁷ This is not to advocate the abandonment of ‘realist’ incremental approaches altogether, but to note that perhaps some bold strategic leaps out of the ‘traditional ‘realist’ boundaries may be necessary. War fighting (winning battles) is essential but very far from sufficient. Peacekeeping / peace development is the new essential paradigm - again, by whatever name and / or focus one uses ‘nation-building’ is upon us all whether we would have it or not.

Further, events are accelerating proportionately collapsing decision space and will overtake transnational civil society if international leadership does not develop a new and daring path toward peacekeeping and peace development. Let us push peace and development in Somalia, and make it the highest concern for all.

Endnotes

¹ This paper was originally developed for and presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society International Conference, 30 October - 1 November the Palmer House Hilton Chicago, Illinois, USA with a more general consideration of issues impacting US civil-military relations and are based on expansion of the principal authors invitation, participation, and presentation at the National Conference on Internal Security held in Mogadishu in 2014. The advocacy for peacekeeping suggestions for the US military was mentioned and implied in the original presentation. Some of those concerns have been edited in the adaptation for this CfPAR publication. Other fundamental issues, such as relations between the SNA and international forces providing assistance international development issues were not a focus. Readers should be aware the authors acknowledge these resulting limitations.

² Most spellings have it as Aidid while others have it as Aideded.

³There are a number of overlapping nomenclatures and forces here. R.W. Stewart (2002, December) The United States Army in Somalia - 1992-1994, Association of the United States Army, The Institute of Land Warfare - www.ausa.org. In response to casualties of U.S. troops attributed to the foes of General Aideded Task Force Ranger was created. See Maj. Clifford E. Day, "Critical Analysis On The Defeat Of Task Force Ranger", A Research Paper Presented To The Research Department Air Command and Staff College In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC, March, 1997.

<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc10.pdf> . See also W. S. Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia", August 1992-March 1994, Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005. See J. P. Pham, "State Collapse, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Somalia", Carlyle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013.

⁴ United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I , April 1992 - March 1993), the U.S. led Unified Task Force (UNITAF - December 1992 - May 1993), and United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II - March 1993 - March 1995). In May 2013, the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution 2102 (2013) establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). See

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosomi.htm>. See <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm>. See <http://unpos.unmissions.org/>. See <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm>.

⁵Michael R. Gordon With John H. Cushman Jr., "In Somalia: After Supporting Hunt for Aidid, U.S. Is Blaming U.N. for Losses", NYT, October 18, 1993. See <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/18/world/mission-in-somalia-after-supporting-hunt-for-aidid-us-is-blaming-un-for-losses.html>.

⁶In addition to the separatist endeavors of Somaliland and Puntland, Baioda, and Jubaland, approximately 20 separate regional governing authorities had tentatively established themselves across Somalia - including Southwestern Somalia, Ayn, Somalia, Maakhir, Northland State, Madar, and Somal. See GlobalSecurity.org <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm>

⁷ Mohamed Osman Omar, Somalia - Past and Present, Mogadishu: Somali Publications Pvt, Ltd., 2006.

⁸ See <http://enoughproject.org/blogs/somalia-civil-war-years-1990s-present>.

⁹Shaul Shay, Somalia between Jihad and Restoration, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.

¹⁰ See <http://unpo.org/members/10714>.

¹¹Andre Le Sage, Militias and Insurgency in Somalia, The Washington Institute, Policy Analysis, Policy Watch 1593, October 26, 2009 - <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/militias-and-insurgency-in-somalia> .

¹²Ken Menkhaus, Somalia - A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare, ENOUGH Strategy Paper, September 2008 - http://www.enoughproject.org/files/somalia_rep090308.pdf . See page 1 and his footnote 4 in particular.

¹³ See the official site AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia - <http://amisom-au.org/>

¹⁴ See [http://www.quazoo.com/q/War_in_Somalia_\(2006-present\)](http://www.quazoo.com/q/War_in_Somalia_(2006-present))

¹⁵Omar Nor, "Somalia Islamist militants abandon last stronghold to government forces", CNN News, October 6, 2014 - <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/05/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab/index.html>

¹⁶David Smith, "Somalia chooses new leader in presidential elections", The Guardian, September 10, 2012 - <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/10/somalia-chooses-new-president-elections> One of his first statements was to criticize illegal fishing in Somali waters noting that any Somali fisherman was being considered a pirate.

¹⁷ Both authors were participants in the Somalia's National Conference on Internal Security held in Mogadishu April 20 - 23, 2014. A great deal of information and a review of the challenges confronting the new government were presented. The phrase "National Conference" refers to that event. References to the event include multiple formal presentations, information gathered in interviews, and that acquired through more casual meetings / conversations.

¹⁸ In various conversations with Somali officials the author had, this lack of knowledge concerning the state of affairs was frequently reiterated, e.g. they had no knowledge of how many desks, chairs, computers, and filing cabinets there were as well as where they were.

¹⁹ These concerns were gathered at the National Conference and are contained in Paul R. Camacho, "Defence and Security in East Africa - A First Draft of Research Notes from Somalia with Initial Analysis", *IUSAFS* Canada, 2014.

²⁰ Mohamed Mubarak, "Somali military has more problems than lack of guns" African Arguments, February 26, 2014 - <http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/26/somali-military-has-more-problems-than-lack-of-guns-by-mohamed-mubarak/>

²¹ Statements of President Mohamud made on 20 April at the al Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu.

²²DaudAweis, "An integrated national army is critical to building trust across Somalia President", Posted By: warka May 14, 2015, <http://www.mareeg.com/an-integrated-national-army-is-critical-to-building-trust-across-somalia-president/>.

²³ A fragment of anecdotal evidence suggests that this question of what kind of Army do the Somalis want is not straightforward. A letter written to the website Hiiraan Online about the subject by one of the authors elicited a few comments: "Somalia needs strong police force and small armyTHAT'S ALL we are not fighting foreign enemy but an internal one". Another: "Most clan-minded readers won't comment on this article, because don't want a strong Somali government institutions [sic]. It's lack of a strong national army that our traditional rivals, Ethiopia & Kenya, are leading the show in our internal politics, designing regional administrations to serve their interest" Still another: [the] "SNA will never return. It is dead as an organization same way the Wehrmacht and the SS are dead. What is being created, trained, armed and funded by the US and EU are just tomorrow's clan militias but better trained. Reconciliation, justice, stability, democracy need to be established first before the possibility of establishing a national army so even considered. It is crazy." [sic] To be found at http://hiiraan.com/op4/2015/aug/100996/a_long_term_comprehensive_focus_will_translate_as_success_for_the_somali_national_army.aspx.

²⁴ The diaspora focus group was conducted at a local Somali community center in Toronto, Canada. The setting was informal and began with seven people with two more coming in shortly after the session began. These individuals were acquainted with each other but were diverse in terms of occupation. They were not all from the

same 'clan' structure, but were in fact primarily from the Mogadishu area in particular and southern Somalia in general. There were seven males and two females. The leading question concerning security was phrased as: What do you think should be done about the police and the development of military institutions? Since some member expressed confusion the question was expanded as whether military should be offensive warrior force or peacekeeping? There was a consensus around peacekeeping (seven individuals) - commitment seemed moderate to the observer. However, the two individuals favoring a 'Rambo' army were very strongly committed. See 2013 International Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, October 25 – 27: Session 43 When the Fighting Ends. See Paul R. Camacho, Abdi Dirshe, and Ibrahim Iman (the title was changed to) "Welcome - Build - Defend - Reconciliation and Development in Somalia" and there was an additional author, Ismail D. Osman. The paper enjoyed the cooperation of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Mohamed, Abdirezak Omar, JamhuuriyaddaDimoqoraadiga ah eeSoomaaliya.

²⁵ Ibrahim Mohamed Abukar, "Discussion Paper 2014 - Review of Priorities for Training the Somalia National Army", Somali National Army Ministry of Defense paper - The provisional constitution of August 2013 refers to the 'armed forces' in Chapter 14, Article 16(1) on page 82.

²⁶ Jerome Binde, "Toward an Ethics of the Future", *Globalization*, (Aarjun Appadurai, Ed.), Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 90-113. Particularly see pp. 92-93.

²⁷ See Paul R. Camacho, "A Long Term Comprehensive Focus will translate as Success for the Somali National Army", Hiiraan Online, August 5, 2015 - http://hiiraan.com/op4/2015/aug/100996/a_long_term_comprehensive_focus_will_translate_as_success_for_the_somali_national_army.aspx

²⁸ Fabrizio Battistelli, "Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 467-484. See also Robert A. Rubinstein, *Peacekeeping Under Fire - Culture and Intervention*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008.

²⁹ See also Chris Seiple, "The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions", *Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership*, U. S. Army War College, 1996. p 195.

³⁰ See Defense Science Board, "Understanding Human Dynamics", Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington D.C. 20301-3140. See p. ix of the executive summary. See Dr. Dallas Owens, Strategic Studies Institute, "Stabilization And Post-Conflict Operations: The Role Of The Military", Conference Brief, *Strategic Studies Institute*, U.S. Army War College, Women in International Security, and Georgetown University January 27, 2005, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=693>.

³¹ Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5. There is also Defense Science Board, Understanding Human Dynamics, Report of the Task Force of the Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board, March 2009, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140. There are also far smaller compositions such as Jacob Kipp, Ph.D.; Lester Grau; Karl Prinslow; and Captain Don Smith, The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century, Military Review, September-October 2006. See also Osburg, J., et al. "Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations", Rand, 2014 - www.rand.org/t/rr387.html. See also Osburg, J., et al. "Best Practices for Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations", Rand, 2014 - http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9784.html. See Binde, Op. cit. pp 91-93. See Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario", *Strategic Studies Institute*, U.S. Army War College, February 2003.

³² Various participants at the National Conference indicated that they particularly required investigation / forensic training and criminal justice organization; one individual indicated they needed FBI training.

³³ Fabrizio Battistelli, Opt. cit. See also Christopher Dandeker, "Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping" Leena, *Military Sociology - Global Perspectives*, Leena Parmar, Ed., Jaipur, India: Rawat Publications, 1999, pp. 117 - 138. Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic

Peacekeeping and Success”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 327-348. See Funmi Olonisakin, "African 'Homemade' Peacekeeping Initiatives", *Armed Forces & Society*, 1997, 23 (3), 349-371.

³⁴ See Mary Harper, *Getting Somalia Wrong? - Faith and Hope in a Shattered State*, African Arguments, London: Zed Books, 2012 pp. 33, 58, 113.

³⁵ For example, one web site reports that the SNA has approximately 12,000 active personnel and another 24,000 reserve personnel, possesses 140 tanks, 430 armored vehicles, 203 pieces of towed artillery, some aircraft and a few coastal patrol ships on a budget of \$58.9 million. This seems highly suspect - a U.S. tank battalion has some 58 tanks; this would indicate that the SNA has two and a half tank battalions. It just seems hard to imagine given the level of destruction, need for spare parts, etc. See http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Somalia.

³⁶ See “SOMALIA: U.S donates military vehicles to newly trained Somali Commandos”, March 6, 2014; <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/03/somalia-u-s-donates-military-vehicles-to-newly-trained-somali-commandos/>

³⁷ The co-author has indicated that the SNA lacks the maintenance capability and noted in email that donated equipment often arrives without adequate maintenance packages. The heavy machinegun is a Krupnokaliberny Pulemet Degtyareva-Shpagina (DSH-K) / Degtyarev-Shpagin.

³⁸ See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘UN arms embargo on Somalia’, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/somalia. See also http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Somalia.

³⁹ Mohamed, “Discussion Paper 2014, Op. cit.

⁴⁰ Claes Nilsson, Johan Norberg. "European Union Training Mission Somalia – A Mission Assessment", European Union Training Mission Somalia, FOI-R--3870--SE, April 2014. For an earlier effort with the old TFG see Kseniya Oksamytna, "The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: Lessons Learnt for EU Security Sector Reform", IAI WORKING PAPERS 11 | 16 – June 2011 - <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiw1116.pdf> . See also <http://terrorfreesomalia.blogspot.com/2011/11/900-newly-trained-somali-soldiers-have.html>

⁴¹ See <http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=italy+trains+somali+soldiers&FORM=VIRE2#view=detail&mid=6F334E6653BD58215E4D6F334E6653BD58215E4D>.

⁴² Shafi’i Mohyaddin, "Somalia and Turkey Reach Military Deal”, *Hiiraan Online*, Thursday, February 27, 2014 http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2014/Feb/53428/somalia_and_turkey_reach_military_deal.aspx.

⁴³ Reuters, "US has a secret military presence in Somalia, July 3, 2014. <http://nypost.com/2014/07/03/us-has-a-secret-military-presence-in-somalia/>

⁴⁴ See “Somalia launches new military academy, integration program”, *Hiiraan Online*, Thursday, May 14, 2015 http://hiiraan.com/news4/2015/May/99582/somalia_launches_new_military_academy_integration_program.aspx .

⁴⁵ European Union Training Mission- EUTM Somalia- Press Release, "Somaliland: Platoon Commanders and Military Police Graduate EUTM Course in Mogadishu", Wednesday, 02 September 2015 15:27, *Somali Sun* at <http://somalilandsun.com/index.php/development-aid/7983-somaliland-platoon-commanders-and-military-police-graduate-eutm-course-in-mogadishu> - There are a number of comments posted; the comments in English are quite negative; whether these are actual opinions or part of a campaign to polarize readers is uncertain. Obviously it indicates the need for constant outreach and engagement with people to garner legitimacy. This will no doubt take more than a decade to succeed.

⁴⁶Discussion Paper 2014, Review of Priorities For Training, The Somalia National Army.

⁴⁷ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles*, American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁴⁸ Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century - War Peace and Politics*, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999. See also Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military - the Changing Security Environment*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

⁴⁹ James N. Rosenau, "Armed Force and Armed Forces in a Turbulent World", *The Adaptive Military*, James Burk (editor), New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998, 49-85

⁵⁰ The development of the spreadsheet VisiCalc was succeeded by Lotus 123 (do any readers remember?) brought creative destruction to the lined ledger book for accounting purposes; this took place within a few years from the 1983 introduction of the IBM PC and word processing and spreadsheet applications. Certainly by 1986 virtually every business had gone or was going digital. With the advent of the internet and subsequent global communications capability expansion came distributed global low cost / value added production. For a discussion of macro level global changes see Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand, *Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1982. See also Daniel Yergin and Joseph A. Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy*, New York: Free Press, 2002. For early versions of industrial change Barry Bluestone, *Deindustrialization of America*, New York: Basic Books 1984. See also Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, *The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America*, New York: Basic Books, 1988. For the latest view see Thomas Piketty, *Capital - in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014. For the impacts on international relations theories and growing interdependency of multi-centric sectors of power see Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Susan Strange, *Mad-Money - When Markets Outgrow Governments*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Robert O. Keohane (editor), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. See David A. Baldwin, (Editor), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism - The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

⁵¹Mark D. Mandeles, Thomas. C. Hone and Sanford S. Terry, *Managing Command and Control in the Persian Gulf War*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.

⁵² David A. Morehouse, *Nonlethal Weapons - War Without Death*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. The concept of real concern is that of 'without death'. This notion may embolden product use with devastating results as was the case in Moscow during the 2002 Nord-Ost hostage crisis as a response to the Chechen Islamist attack. See Robert Mandel, "Nonlethal Weaponry and Post-Cold War Deterrence", *Armed Forces & Society*, Summer 2004; vol. 30, 4: pp. 511-537.

⁵³Richard A. Clark and Robert K. Knake, *Cyber War*, New York: Harper Collins, 2010; P. W. Singer, *Wired For War - The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*, London: Penguin Books, 2010. See Jeremiah Gertler, "U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems", *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress, January 3, 2012, 7-5700 www.crs.gov, R42136 - <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf> . A recent bibliography was compiled by Jenny Silkett, MSLS and Greta Andrusyszyn, "MLS, Impact Of Accelerating Technology - A Selected Bibliography", U.S. Army War College Library, September 2013 - http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/Impact_Accelerating_Technology_2013.pdf. For a foundation / 'think tank' discussion see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY - Preparing for War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New American Security, January 2014 - http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_20YY_WorkBrimley.pdf

⁵⁴William W. Newman, "Hegemonic Disruption: The Asymmetric Challenge to U.S. Leadership", Maxwell AFB, AL: *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Air University Press, Volume 5, No. 3, Fall 2011.

⁵⁵George E. Reed and R. Craig Bullis, "The Impact of Destructive Leadership on Senior Military Officers and Civilian Employees", *Armed Forces & Society*, October 2009; vol. 36, 1: pp. 5-18. Paul S. Oh and David E. Lewis, "Management and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees", *Armed Forces & Society*, Summer 2008, vol. 34, 4: pp. 639-661.

⁵⁶ See Jerome Adams, Howard T. Prince II, Debra Instonea, and Robert W. Rice, "West Point: Critical Incident of Leadership", *Armed Forces & Society*, Summer 1984, vol. 10, 4: pp. 597-611. See Connie Brownson, "The Battle for Equivalency: Female US Marines Discuss Sexuality, Physical Fitness, and Military Leadership", *Armed Forces & Society*, October 2014, vol. 40, 4: pp. 765-788. Anthony C. King, "Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat", *Armed Forces & Society*, April 2015, vol. 41, 2: pp. 379-387. And for a rebuttal see Connie Brownson, "Rejecting Patriarchy for Equivalence in the US Military: A Response to Anthony King's 'Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat'", *Armed Forces & Society*, 0095327X14547807, first published on August 27, 2014

⁵⁷For an in depth account of line grade officers in the Dutch forces see Jos Groen, *Junior Leadership in Afghanistan - 2006 - 2010 - Testimonies of a Mission*, Haraen, Netherlands, Books with a Mission, 2013 - bookswithamission@gramil.com. For an examination of the enlisted attitudes and performance of men and women in Iraq see Morten G. Ender, *American Soldiers in Iraq - McSoldiers or Innovative Professionals*, New York: Routledge, 2009.

⁵⁸Robert Mandel, "The Privatization of Security", *Armed Forces & Society*, Fall 2001; vol. 28, 1: pp. 129-151. Deborah Avant, "Privatizing Training: A Challenge to U.S. Army Professionalism?", *The Future of the Army Profession*, Lloyd J. Mathews (editor), Don M. Snyder and Gayle L. Watkins, (project directors), Boston: McGraw-Hill Print, 2002, 179-196. Lindsay P. Cohn, "It Wasn't in My Contract: Security Privatization and Civilian Control", *Armed Forces & Society*, July 2011, vol. 37, 3: pp. 381-398, first published on November 10, 2010. Paul Camacho, "A Forum on Privatization With Comments on the Relevant Literature Found in *Armed Forces & Society*", *Armed Forces & Society*, July 2010, vol. 36, 4: pp. 647-659. The forum contains discussion by several authors. For a privatization 'success story' of cooperation between the military and civilian technicians see Ryan Keltz, "The U.S. Navy's Maiden Voyage: Effects of Integrating Sailors and Civilian Mariners on Deployment", *Armed Forces & Society*, Summer 2008; vol. 34, 4: pp. 536-564.

⁵⁹ Elisabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell, "The Digital Battlefield: What Army Transformation Efforts Say about Its Future Professional Jurisdiction", *The Future of the Army Profession*, Lloyd J. Mathews (editor), Don M. Snyder and Gayle L. Watkins, (project directors), Boston: McGraw-Hill Print, 2002. See Douglass A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997. See also Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Future War / Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower", *Strategic Studies Institute*, U.S. Army War College, March 2003.

⁶⁰ Michael Isikoff and David Coen, *Hubris - The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War*, New York: Crown Publishers, 2006; See Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco - The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, New York: Penguin Press, 2006. See also Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City - Inside Iraq's Green Zone*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006. Mike Hoyt, John Palattella (editors), and the staff of the Columbia Journalism Review, *Reporting Iraq - an oral history of the war by the journalists who covered it*, Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2007. For a more analytic discussion of media coverage of the military see Nancy Ethiel (editor), *The Military and the Media: Public Perceptions*, Cantigny Conference Series, Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2000.

⁶¹See Lindy Heineken, "Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences for the Military Profession", *Armed Forces & Society*, October 2014; vol. 40, 4: pp. 625-646. See Paul R. Camacho, "Privatization of Military Capability Has Gone Too Far: A Response to Lindy Heineken's 'Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences for the Military Profession'", *Armed Forces & Society*, January 2015; vol. 41, 1: pp. 174-188. The author has documented a large number of sources here including the exchange concerning the labeling of 'Republicanization'.

⁶² See T. D. Weldon, *The Vocabulary of Politics*, Baltimore MD: Penguin Books, 1955. Weldon has an interesting nomenclature: puzzles; which have only one answer, are solved; problems, which have a number of paths for response, are addressed; finally difficulties, which are quite complex are surmounted - bypassed for the present to be reduced to manageable frameworks later.

⁶³ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004. Barnett utilized "the non-integrating gap" to characterize the arc of instability. It has a significant advantage in that it implies the conflict over the process, and consequences of globalization in all its forms, not only in terms of the dependent variable – security.

⁶⁴ David Jablonsky, *Paradigm Lost? - Transitions and the Search for a New World Order*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995.

⁶⁵ Dr. Dallas Owens, Strategic Studies Institute, "Stabilization and Post-Conflict Operations, Op Cit. See Alexander Woodcock and David Davis, *The Cornwallis Group II, Analysis for and of the Resolution of Conflict*, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1998 and Alexander Woodcock and David Davis, *The Cornwallis Group III, Analysis for Peace Operations*, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1998. Both of these publications are highly detailed studies. See Defense Science Board, "Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities", December 2004, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140. For an excellent historical view of military in cross cultural clash see James C. Bradford, *The Military and Conflict between Cultures - Soldiers at the Interface* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997.

⁶⁶ James Burk, "Editor's Note Why Peacekeeping", Special Issue on Peacekeeping, *Armed Forces & Society*, Spring 1997, Vol. 23 (3).

⁶⁷ James N. Rosenau, "Armed Force and Armed Forces in a Turbulent World", *The Adaptive Military - Armed Forces in a Turbulent Role*, James Burk (Editor), New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998, pp. 49-85. See the executive summary of the Defense Science Board, Op. Cit.

⁶⁸ Richard N. Haass, *Intervention - The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*, Washington, D.C.: A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1994. Richard Connaughton, *Military Intervention in the 1990s: A New Logic of War*, NY: Routledge, 1994.

⁶⁹ Lloyd J. Mathews, Conference Report: "Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post Conflict in the 21st Century", Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2004. See Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000. Particularly relevant is chapter three: "Failing Before Beginning", 35-49. See also John Hillen, *Blue Helmets - The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, Washington: Brassey's, 1998. See also Christopher Dandeker, "Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping" Leena, *Military Sociology - Global Perspectives*, Leena Parmar, Ed., Jaipur, India: Rawat Publications, 1999, pp. 117 - 138.

⁷⁰ Robert A. Rubinstein, *Peacekeeping under Fire - Culture and Intervention*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008.

⁷¹ Deborah Avant and James Lebovic, "U.S. Military Attitudes Toward Post-Cold War Missions", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 27, No 1, Fall 2000, pp 37-56.

⁷² Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, "Humanitarians or Warriors: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope", *Armed Forces & Society*, Summer 1995; vol. 21, 4: pp. 615-637. Laura L. Miller, "Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia", *Armed Forces & Society*, Volume 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 415 - 450. Miller noted the sense of mission understanding was identified as a factor by Segal. See David R. Segal, Theodore P. Furukawa, Jerry C. Lindh, "Light Infantry as Peacekeepers in the Sinai", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 16, No.3, Spring 1990, pp. 385-403. Battistelli Op. Cit. mentions this. His study actually has more in common with Avant's in that he focused primarily on officers

and developed a short list of heuristics, which were however connected to types. Avant noted several points concerning officers' perceptions e.g. the greater the danger when they are less than keen about, that degrees of approval tied to beliefs about public and so forth. Battistelli suggested similar heuristics about attitude but these heuristics of mission satisfaction were tied to 'types' of professionals: paleo-modern, modern, or postmodern motivation.

⁷³Jaz Azari, Christopher Dandeker, and Neil Greenberg, "Cultural Stress: How Interactions With and Among Foreign Populations Affect Military Personnel", *Armed Forces & Society*, 2010, 36 (4) 585–603. David R. Segal, Theodore P. Furukawa, Jerry C. Lindh, "Light Infantry as Peacekeepers in the Sinai", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 16, No.3, Spring 1990, pp. 385-403. See David M. Last, "Making Peacekeeping More Effective", *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations*, Cornwallis Park, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997.

⁷⁴Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti, "Evaluating UN Peacekeeping with Matching to Improve Causal Inference", Department of Politics New York University October 20, 2006 - http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/causalinf/papers/gilligan_sergenti_06.pdf

⁷⁵ Patrick Paterson, (Lieutenant Commander U.S. Navy), Darfur and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa Military Review, July-August 2008 - http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20080831_art006.pdf. Again, for the Somalia disaster see Chris Seiple, "The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions", Op. Cit. p 195. See also See Funmi Olonisakin, Op. Cit. Chris Seiple, "The U.S. Military/Ngo Relationship In Humanitarian Interventions", *Peacekeeping Institute Center for Strategic Leadership*, U. S. Army War College, 1996 - http://globalengage.org/attachments/429_Seiple-%20The%20U.S.%20Military-NGO%20Relationship%20in%20Humanitarian%20Interventions.pdf .

⁷⁶ See Paul F. Diehl, *International Peace-keeping*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993. See also older discussion going back to the post-Vietnam era such as Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention*, New York: David McKay, 1969. For an earlier and much more post-Vietnam outlook concerning the future see Ellen P. Stern, (editor), *The Limits of Military Intervention*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. 1977, which was an early product of IUSAFS.

⁷⁷Paul Lederach, *Building Peace - Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002

⁷⁸ Ibrahim Mohamed, "Somali National Army Concept Note - Comprehensive Capacity Building Plan (Phase 1)", SNA / MOD - concept paper produced for consideration of research unit project Paul Camacho, Response To SNA Discussion Paper Of 2014 And Capacity Building Plan, February 2015. Subsequently the authors worked on a "Review of Somali National Army (SNA) Concept Note - Comprehensive Capacity Building Plan - Phase 1" 1st draft of critique - November 21, 2014

⁷⁹ See <http://www.mareeg.com/somalia-appointed-new-armed-forced-chief/>; See also <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2015/09/somalia-press-release-cabinet-meeting-the-appointment-of-new-army-chief/>; See also <http://www.somalicurrent.com/2015/09/03/somali-govt-appoint-new-army-chief-in-a-new-strategy-to-fight-al-shabab/> Prime Minister Abdirashid Sharmarke indicated that his predecessor(s) left the forces in a better shape.

⁸⁰ If / as confidence concerning non-attribution is obtained questions about their view of their leadership, integration, etc. can be gathered. For example, what would the common soldiers think about playing a role in integration, how would they perceive its advance; would they welcome being 'paired off' with a soldier from another clan / militia for peacekeeping duties, etc.

⁸¹ Adrian Oldfield, "Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World", *The Citizenship Debates*, Gershon Shaefir, editor, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, pp. 75-89. See

also Herman R. van Gunsteren, *A Theory of Citizenship - Organizing Plurality in Contemporary Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998

⁸²Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *A Call To Civic Service – National Service for Country and Community*, New York: The Free Press, 1989. Civic service programs will require participation from the local / district levels. A variety of efforts should be first designed and implemented as demonstration projects. These efforts should also be followed with evaluation assessments of their efficacy. Each of the socio-identification communities should be involved, design a program that incorporates contribution of their expertise. Public sector entrepreneurship should be cultivated at all levels and among all identification groups. Basic local level developments are the more than likely the most important. All carefully planned projects should be incrementally and methodically implemented and evaluated for their efficacy prior to expansion.

⁸³"Somalia offers amnesty to al-Shabab fighters", Aljazeera, 3 September, 2014 - <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/somalia-offers-amnesty-al-shabab-fighters-201493222945948695.html>. See <http://allafrica.com/stories/201507190084.html>. See also Dr. Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdi Aynte, "Somalia: The Case for Negotiating with al-Shabaab", *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, January 2012, <http://studies.aljazeera.net>. See also Jonas Gahrstore, "In Defense of Dialogue: Why We must Talk", Best of TED, Season 1: 8; the argument is a large global deficit of dialogue impairs the ability to address conflict. You do not make peace with your friends, but with your enemies.

⁸⁴ For an extremely interesting approach to significant issues concerning short and long term conceptualizations of time on decision processes in the general globalization environment see Jerome Binde, "Towards an Ethics of the Future", *Globalization*, Arjun Appadurai, Ed., Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, p 91. There are definite implications here for frameworks of conflict and reconciliation definitions and strategies in general, which are certainly relevant for the Somali context.

⁸⁵ Travis Hirschi, *Causes of Delinquency*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969

⁸⁶See Eric Schmitt and SominiSengupta, "Thousands Enter Syria to Assist Militants in ISIS", NYT: Sunday September 27, 2015, p. 1, 4. An genuine alternative offering opportunity for participation and a sense of belonging that can counter the apocalyptic appeal of ISIL appeal has to be created.

⁸⁷ David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision - Policy Evaluation as a Social Process*, NY: A Free Press Paperback, Macmillan Publishing, 1963.